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Abstract—During the Coincheck incident, which recorded
the largest damages in cryptocurrency history in 2018, it was
demonstrated that using Mosaic token can have a certain effect.
Although it seems attractive to employ tokens as countermea-
sures for cryptocurrency leakage, Mosaic is a specific token
for the New Economy Movement (NEM) cryptocurrency and
is not employed for other blockchain systems or cryptocurren-
cies. Moreover, although some volunteers tracked leaked NEM
using Mosaic in the CoinCheck incident, it would be better
to verify that the volunteers can be trusted. Simultaneously,
if someone (e.g., who stole cryptocurrencies) can identify the
volunteers, then that person or organization may be targets of
them. In this paper, we propose an anonymous trust-marking
scheme on blockchain systems that is universally applicable
to any cryptocurrency. In our scheme, entities called token
admitters are allowed to generate tokens adding trustworthiness
or untrustworthiness to addresses. Anyone can anonymously
verify whether these tokens were issued by a token admitter.
Simultaneously, only the designated auditor and no one else,
including nondesignated auditors, can identify the token admit-
ters. Our scheme is based on accountable ring signatures and
commitment, and is implemented on an elliptic curve called
Curve25519, and we confirm that both cryptographic tools are
efficient. Moreover, we also confirm that our scheme is applicable
to Bitcoin, Ethereum, and NEM.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cryptocurrencies (cryptoassets) such as Bitcoin, Ethereum,
and NEM have attracted attention in various aspects, such
as the large market capitalization and the use of smart con-
tracts. Because of a cryptocurrency’s decentralized structure,
there is merit in fault tolerance and anyone can check the
content of transactions; thus, a certain level of transparency
is guaranteed. However, cryptocurrencies have been used for
crimes because of their anonymity and have become a target
of cyberattacks as their value increases. Furthermore, since it
seems difficult to stop suspicious transactions such as unau-
thorized withdrawals or exchanges before they happen, it is
important to consider countermeasures after cryptocurrencies
are stolen.
During the Coincheck incident, which recorded the largest
damages in cryptocurrency history in 2018, some volun-
teers tracked leaked New Economy Movement (NEM) cryp-
tocurrencies using Mosaic, which is a NEM-specific fea-
ture allowing a self-made token to be sent on the NEM
blockchain. These volunteers sent Mosaic to addresses that
received leaked NEMs from Coincheck addresses and warned
the recipients that these should not be exchanged for other
cryptocurrencies or legal currencies. A criminal can discard
such marked addresses, so it can be seen as a cat-and-
mouse game. It was not recognized that a large amount
of NEM was exchanged via legally authorized exchanges.
The criminal finally exchanged stolen NEM via a self-made
exchange established on the dark web (hidden service) until
the removal of the system on March 18, 2018 [1]. Thus, the
effectiveness of tokens in preventing the spread of leaked
NEMs is admitted. Because theft of cryptocurrencies has
become a real risk, it seems effective to employ tokens as
countermeasures for cryptocurrency leakage. However, there
are issues to be solved:
• Mosaic is a specific token for NEM, and it is not em-
ployed for other blockchain systems or cryptocurrencies.
• There is no way to check whether the volunteers can be
trusted.
• If someone (e.g., who stole cryptocurrencies) can iden-
tify the volunteers, then that person or organization may
be targets of them.
From a functionality standpoint, it seems effective to add
trustworthiness to addresses, but the Mosaic token instead
adds untrustworthiness to addresses. For example, if an ad-
dress is authorized by adding a token for trustworthiness, then
anyone can recognize it by checking whether the token is
included in the corresponding transaction.
One might think that claims, which are defined in the ERC-
725/ERC-735 Ethereum Identity Standard1 could be used to
add and remove tokens. When a user wants to deploy smart
contracts, a claim issuer (who may or may not be the user)
can add some information relative to the user’s identity, and it
can be verified as a credential. However, anonymity of claim
issuers is not a primary subject of the standards; thus, it cannot
be directly employed for our usage. One naive solution is to
1See https://erc725alliance.org/ or https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/
issues/735.
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employ anonymous signatures such as ring signatures [34],
especially linkable ring signatures [4], [25], [27], [37], [38],
[40], which have been widely used to add anonymity in
cryptocurrencies such as Monero [30]. This solution assumes
that there are token admitters who are trusted; i.e., they
are recognized as entities that can issue tokens but are not
allowed further responsibilities. They generate a signature
and include the signature on a transaction. In the signed
message, anyone can check whether the address is authorized
or unauthorized by verifying the signature. This method
does not choose the underlying blockchain system. Moreover,
anyone can anonymously check whether a token admitter
generates a signature. This naive solution looks promising, but
an issue of anonymity arises. For example, if an address will
behave maliciously using a trustworthiness token, then the
trustworthiness of the corresponding token admitter should
be reduced. Moreover, if some users who have addresses
deny the addition of a token for untrustworthiness, then the
corresponding token admitter needs to be traced. However,
there is no way to identify the corresponding token admitter
if (linkable) ring signatures are employed. Thus, it seems ef-
fective to consider auditors, who can identify token admitters
from signatures.
Another naive solution is to employ group signatures [15].
In this scenario, a group manager issues signing keys to
users. A user generates a signature, and a verifier verifies the
signature anonymously, i.e., checks whether the signer is a
group member. If an accident happens, the group manager
can identify the signer using a secret key. However, this
centralized structure does not match decentralized blockchain
systems. If we consider permissioned blockchain systems,
then there is an additional access control layer and it may
allow us to prepare such centralized organizations. However,
it restricts the coverage of the system.
Our Contribution: In this paper, we propose a trust-marking
scheme on blockchain systems explained as follows:
• The trust-marking scheme is universally applicable
to any cryptocurrency, and works even in public
blockchains.
• Token admitters can anonymously issue tokens for ei-
ther trustworthiness or untrustworthiness to addresses by
generating accountable ring signatures [11], [21], [23],
[43].
• Token admitters designate an auditor when they issue
tokens, and only the auditor can identify who issued the
tokens.
As building blocks, we employ accountable ring signa-
tures [11], [21], [23], [43], which can be seen as a gen-
eralization of ring and group signatures (See Section II).
To our knowledge, an attempt to employ accountable ring
signatures as tokens has not previously been made, although
ring signatures have been widely employed in blockchain
systems. By checking accountable ring signatures, anyone
could anonymously check whether a token admitter generated
a signature. Moreover, because of anonymity, even if someone
who stole cryptocurrencies wanted to retaliate against the
corresponding token admitter, that person or organization
would not be able to identify the token admitter. If an
accident happened, only the designated auditor could identify
the signer. In other words, our scheme preserves decen-
tralized structures, because nondesignated auditors cannot
break anonymity. We also consider a case in which a token
admitter revokes trustworthiness or untrustworthiness tokens.
Subsequently, only the actual token admitter can issue a
trustworthiness or untrustworthiness token. The fact that two
tokens were issued by the same token admitter is revealed but
still the token admitter is anonymous.
We implemented our scheme using the Bootle et al.
accountable ring signature scheme [11] and the Pedersen
commitment scheme [32], employed Curve25519 [10]. To
comfirm whether our scheme is universally applicable to any
cryptocurrency, we selected Bitcoin, Ethereum, and NEM for
capturing various features.2
Related Work: The word “Tokens” has been widely used
in other blockchain systems. Here, for the sake of clarity
and for explaining the difference from our work, we intro-
duce these works as follows. Basically, a token is a non-
sensitive surrogate value which is replaced from sensitive el-
ements (this replacement procedure is so-called tokenization),
and is employed for privacy-preserving payment system.
Here, token is regarded as cryptocurrency itself. To name a
few: Zerocoin [28], Zerocash [7], Confidential Assets [33],
QuisQuis [16], and Zether [12].
For adding auditability (as in our scheme), Androulaki et
al. [3] proposed a privacy-preserving and auditable token
management system for permissioned blockchain systems
such as Hyperledger Fabric [2]. The Androulaki et al. system
architecture is somewhat similar to our scheme where users,
issuers, and auditors are defined (in their paper a certifier and
a registration authority are also defined). Briefly, users own
tokens that represent some real-world assets. They wish to
exchange their tokens with other users in the network. Issuers
are authorized to introduce tokens (as in token admitters
in our scheme). Auditors inspect transactions of users. One
big difference from our work is that they did not consider
anonymity of issuers. Moreover, in their system, auditors are
not designated at each token generation phase where each
user is assigned an auditor at registration time and that this
assignment is immutable. Yuen [44] also proposed a private,
authenticated and auditable consortium (i.e., partly private)
blockchain. The system considers sender/recipient privacy,
where the identity of a sender/recipient of a transaction is not
revealed to any third party, and transaction privacy, where
the content of the transaction is not revealed to any third
party. In addition, auditability is introduced, where the auditor
can recover the sender identity, recipient identity and/or the
2Briefly, Bitcoin adopts UTXO (unspent transaction output) while
Ethereum and NEM adopt account based transaction models. Bitcoin and
Ethereum adopt PoW (Proof of Work) while NEM adopts PoI (Proof of
Importance). Our scheme is applicable regardless of these features.
transaction amount. That is, the audit target is different from
our purpose. Ku¨sters et al. [22] also considered accountability
in permissioned blockchains. They insisted that all parties
know each other, and hence, accountability incentivizes all
parties to behave honestly. We would like to insist that
accountability is also important in public blockchains, and
we mainly consider this setting as mentioned above. Garman
et al. [17] proposed a decentralized anonymous payment
system in the public blockchain. The system is capable of
enforcing compliance with specific transaction policies. They
considered a coin tracing scheme where individual coins can
be marked for tracing. Briefly, all of the information needed
to trace the output coins is encrypted under the existing key
for the input coin commitments, and all of this output is
encrypted by authority’s public key. One big difference from
our work is that they did not consider both trustworthiness
and untrustworthiness.
Camenisch et al. [13] proposed a delegatable anonymous
credential system. An (attribute-based) anonymous credential
is a set of attributes certified to a user by an issuer. A
user can prove the possession of a credential via a zero-
knowledge proof system by creating a fresh token. Then,
the user can select which attributes need to be included
when the token is created. Because credentials are typically
issued in a hierarchical manner, Camenisch et al. considered
delegatability of credentials to hide information revealed from
the chain of issuers. Moreover, they consider an application
of the system to a permissioned blockchain. Basically, in
the system users spontaneously generate tokens to prove the
possession of a credential. On the other hand, in our scheme
users (addresses) are forcibly evaluated and issued a token.
Zhang et al. [46] proposed a system that signs cryptocur-
rency transactions by linkable group signatures [29]. The
system enables us to trace a payer’s identity in consortium
blockchain based anonymous cryptocurrencies in case a payer
misbehaves in the system. The anonymity can be retained if
a user behaves honestly.
Token-based traceability systems also have been consid-
ered. For example, Westerkamp et al. [42] proposed e a
blockchain-based supply chain traceability system using smart
contracts. A non-fungible token (NFT), which is an iden-
tifiable token reflecting digital goods or physical goods, is
standardized in ERC-7213, corresponds to a batch of physical
goods. Watanabe et al. [41] proposed a token-based traceabil-
ity system based on a directed acyclic graph (DAG). They in-
sisted that NFT is expected to be able to represent complicated
operations in traceability systems, everyone needs to easily
confirm the history of the circulation of tokens related to
each product. Their system allows us to efficiently retrieval of
past histories. In these use cases, tokens are basically used for
tracing a product’s provenance. On the other hand, our scheme
evaluates (un)trustworthiness of addresses themselves.
Omote et al. [31] proposed a system that adds
(un)trustworthiness to addresses where a special address (as in
3See https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/master/EIPS/eip-721.md.
a token admitter of our scheme) sends a few Bitcoin to them
as a token. As differences from our work, they considerd
Bitcoin only and did not consider anonymity of the token
admitter.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Accountable Ring Signatures: In blockchain systems, a
transaction is signed by a secret key connected with an
address. According to applications, anonymous signatures
(as the underlying signature scheme) and a decentralized
structure are required. Thus, ring signatures [34] rather than
group signatures are employed, especially in the cryptocur-
rency context. The ring signatures enabled a signer to sign
anonymously. Each user generated a public verification key
and a secret signing key, selected a ring that is a set of
verification keys, and generated a signature on behalf of
the ring. A verifier could verify whether the signer was
a member of the ring. Unlike pseudonyms, ring signatures
provide unlinkability (i.e., even if the same signer generated
two signatures, nobody would know those signatures were
generated by the same signer) and unforgeability (defined
as in digital signatures) (see [8] for the detailed security
definition). To prevent double spending in privacy-preserving
cryptocurrencies, linkable ring signatures [4], [25], [27], [37],
[38], [40], providing weak anonymity compared with that
of ring signatures, were employed, e.g., in CryptoNote [39]
(see [38] for the detailed security definition of (one-time)
linkable ring signatures). A ring confidential transaction
(RingCT) [30], [37], [45] employed a similar cryptographic
technique.
Although strong anonymity (meaning no entity can identify
the actual signer) is an attractive and effective security in a
privacy-preserving context, it may cause unexpected incidents
(e.g., signers may behave maliciously because they will not
be identified). In group signatures, a group manager has the
power to track a signer, but this ability is too strong, and
the group manager can become a big brother. In particular,
its centralized structure does not match the structure of
blockchain systems.
Xu and Yung [43] proposed accountable ring signatures as
a generalization of ring signatures and group signatures. As
in ring signatures, each user generated a public verification
key and a secret signing key. Openers generated own public
key and secret opening key. A user made a ring (a set of
verification keys), designated an opener public key, and gen-
erated a signature using his or her own signing key. A verifier
verified whether a signer was contained in the ring, and only
the designated opener could identify the actual signer. Later,
Bootle et al. formalized the security definitions. In particular,
they considered signature hijacking attacks [35] and provided
the function that allowed the opening result to be publicly
verified [6]. Bootle et al. also provided a concrete accountable
ring signature scheme with a logarithmic signature size of the
number of ring members. The Bootle et al. scheme is based on
the Camenisch-Stadler group signature scheme [14] and the
Groth-Kohlweiss one-out-of-many proofs of knowledge [19].
It was secure under the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) as-
sumption (in prime-order groups), which is widely recognized
as a standard cryptographic assumption. Moreover, assuming
the hardness of the DDH problem allows us to employ
Curve25519 [10] to implement the scheme.4 In contrast, Lai et
al. [23] showed a relationship between sanitizable signatures
and accountable ring signatures and proposed an accountable
ring signature scheme with a constant signature size. One
downside of the scheme was that it employed composite-
order bilinear groups. As an alternative, Kumawat et al. [21]
proposed another accountable ring signature scheme from
indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) [5] which is recognized
as one of the extremely strong cryptographic tools. Thus, we
mainly followed the Bootle et al. scheme in this paper.
Definition 1 (Syntax of Accountable Ring Signatures [11]):
• Setup(1λ): The setup algorithm takes as input a security
parameter λ ∈ N and outputs a common parameter pp.
• OKGen(pp): The opener key generation algorithm takes
as input pp, and outputs an opener public key opk and
a secret key osk.
• UKGen(pp): The user key generation algorithm takes as
input pp, and outputs a user public key pk and a secret
key sk.
• Sign(opk,M,R, sk): The signing algorithm takes as in-
put opk, a message to be signed M , a ring R, and
sk and outputs a ring signature σ. We assume that the
corresponding pk is contained in R.
• Verify(opk,M,R, σ): The verification algorithm takes as
inputs opk, M , R, and σ and outputs 1 (accept) or 0
(reject).
• Open(M,R, σ, osk): The opening algorithm takes as
inputs M , R, σ, and osk and outputs pk of the signer
and its proof pi or ⊥ otherwise.
• Judge(opk,M,R, σ, pk, pi): The judge algorithm takes as
inputs opk, M , R, σ, pk, and pi and outputs 1 (meaning
that σ is generated by sk corresponding to pk) or 0
otherwise. If σ is not valid or pk 6∈ R, then output 0.
Correctness is defined as a standard mannar such that, if
all keys are honestly generated and a signature is honestly
generated using them, then the verification of the signature
always outputs 1. Beside correctness, Bootle et al. defined
four security notions: full unforgeability, full anonymity,
traceability, and tracing soundness. Full unforgeability en-
sures that an adversary who may corrupt all-but-one users
and openers cannot produce a forged signature, proof that the
signature is valid, and proof with a verification key that the
noncorrupted user is accepted by the Judge algorithm. Full
anonymity ensures that an adversary who may have all signing
keys (and secret keys of nondesignated openers, as discussed
later) cannot distinguish whether two signatures are generated
4Symmetric pairings, defined as a map from points on elliptic curves
to an element on a finite field, are known as a DDH solver. It is well
known that Curve25519 cannot be used for pairing-based cryptography, i.e.,
Curve25519 is not a pairing-friendly curve. Thus, we can assume that the
DDH assumption holds.
by the same signing key. 5 Traceability ensures that designated
openers can always identify the actual signer and can produce
valid proof for their identification. Tracing soundness ensures
that a signature cannot trace two different signers. See [11]
for the formal security definitions.
Remark: The syntax and security definitions of accountable
ring signatures given in Bootle et al. [11] considered only
one opener. However, because of our usage, e.g., a signer
designates an opener, it is natural to consider plural openers.
6 According to this modification, we also need to modify
the security definition in which nobody except the designated
opener can break anonymity; i.e., an adversary of anonymity
is allowed to obtain secret keys of nondesignated openers.
This modification does not affect security. Let ` openers be
defined. Then, the adversary is allowed to corrupt (i.e., is
allowed to know the secret keys of) at most ` − 1 openers.
In the security proof of anonymity, just guessing the non-
corrupted opener is enough, and its probability is at least
1/`.
The Bootle et al. scheme is secure in the common reference
model (i.e., a common parameter pp needs to be honestly
generated). We discuss how to generate pp in our scheme
later.
Commitment: A commitment scheme Com consists of three
algorithms. The ComSetup algorithm takes as input a security
parameter λ ∈ N and outputs a common reference string crs.
The Commit algorithm takes as inputs crs and a message M
to be committed and outputs a commitment C and a decomit
dec. The ComOpen algorithm takes as inputs crs, C, M , and
dec and outputs 1 (meaning that C is a commitment of M )
or 0 otherwise. A commitment scheme provides both hiding
(no information of M is revealed from C) and binding (C
is not opened to two (M, dec) 6= (M ′, dec′)) properties. In
our implementation, we employ the Pedersen commitment
scheme [32] which provides computational binding (under the
discrete logarithm (DL) assumption) and perfect hiding. We
remark that crs needs to be generated honestly. We discuss
how to generate crs in our scheme later.
Common Reference String: In the Bootle et al. accountable
ring signature scheme, h1, . . . , hn ∈ G, where G is a group
of prime order p, and a public key of the ElGamal encryption
scheme ek = gτ , where τ ∈ Zp, need to be honestly
generated. That is, nobody knows logg h1, . . . , logg hn, and
τ . If there is no central authority, i.e., in permissionless
blockchains, we need to consider how to generate them.
In the Pedersen scheme, the ComSetup algorithm outputs
crs = (g, h) where g, h ∈ G are generators. For M ∈ Zp,
the Commit algorithm randomly chooses dec ∈ Zp and
5As a similar primitive, Zhang et al. [47] proposed revocable and linkable
ring signatures. One big diffirence from accountable ring signatures is
linkability, where anyone can link whether two signatures are generated by
the same signing key.
6As a similar primitive, multi-opener group signatures have been pro-
posed [9], [18], [26] where plural openers identify the signer as a threshold
manner.
computes C = gMhdec. The ComOpen algorithm outputs 1
if C = gMhdec holds and 0 otherwise. Here, crs needs to be
generated honestly, i.e., nobody knows logg h.
We assume that the generator g is publicly specified and
we employed the generator of Curve25519 defined by the x-
coordinate is 9 [24]. We employed the multi-CRS setting [20].
We assumed that a token admitter i chose τi ∈ Zp, computed
eki = g
τ
i , and broadcast eki to other token admitters.
Simultaneously, the token admitter i proved the knowledge of
τi via a zero-knowledge proof system. Finally, ek is defined
as ek =
∑
eki. We also assumed that all token admitters
did not collude. h1, . . . , hn and h also could be generated
similarly.
III. PROPOSED ANONYMOUS TRUST-MARKING SCHEME
In this section, we give our anonymous trust-marking
scheme. As the first attempt, we simply added an audit
functionality to CryptoNote [39], which provides anonymity
in Monero. CryptoNote originally provided an audit func-
tionality in which secret values were revealed outside the
blockchain. However, we could not control who would audit
it. Thus, we tried to change (linkable) ring signatures on
CryptoNote to accountable ring signatures. Then, a signer
who signed an address could designate an auditor and in-
clude the auditor public key on the signed message. Anyone
could check both the transaction validity and the designated
auditor. Therefore, it seemed the signature could be seen as a
token. However, in anonymous blockchain systems, addresses
are anonymous. Thus, we needed to additionally prepare a
function for proving possession of tokens, which may be
implemented by employing zero-knowledge proof systems,
but there is no motivation if an untrustworthiness token is
issued. So, we constructed our scheme on nonanonymous
blockchain systems. In the system, if token admitters have
addresses for sending transactions, then no anonymity is
provided. One solution was to share a common address among
token admitters. However, because the secret key associated
with the address was also shared, all token admitters could
withdraw remittance fee freely, a situation that was not
desirable. Thus, we separated the right to send transactions
and the right to generate token. We defined the entities in our
scheme as follows:
• Users who have addresses to be used for sending trans-
actions.
• Token admitters who issue trustworthiness or untrust-
worthiness tokens to users.
• Token submitters who send tokens to users on behalf of
token admitters.
• Token verifiers who check the validity of tokens; in
actual scenarios, they may be other users who would
like to check the trustworthiness or untrustworthiness of
the user who was issued the token or may be currency
exchanges that would like to check that the cryptocur-
rencies were not stolen.
• Auditors who identify token admitters if they are desig-
nated by token admitters.
We also need to consider the case that a token admitter has
evaluated the trustworthiness or untrustworthiness of a user
(address), and later the trustworthiness or untrustworthiness
need to be revoked, e.g., an address behaves maliciously after
a token for trustworthiness is issued to the address. This token
revocation functionality is also important since once some
values are written in a blockchain system, it is quite difficult
to remove them from the system owing to the availability of
blockchain. We need to guarantee that no token admitter can
revoke a token unless the token was issued by myself. Since
token admitters are anonymous, we need to carefully link
whether two token admitters are the same without detracting
anonymity. We realize it by using a commitment scheme.
Next, we define the message format to be signed as follows.
• Address of the target user.
• A flag indicating either trustworthiness or untrustworthi-
ness.
• Public key of the designated auditor.
• Expiry time.
• Either a commitment or both the corresponding de-
commitment and the hash value of the corresponding
transaction (which are explained later).
• Any message, e.g., “This user appropriately sent transac-
tions.” or “This user received cryptocurrencies *** that
were leaked on CCYYMMDD from ***.”
We assume that a common parameter pp and a common ref-
erence string crs have been honestly generated (as mentioned
in the Appendix). At the initial step, each token admitter runs
(pk, sk)← UKGen(pp). We denote (pki, ski) as the i-th token
admitter. Each auditor runs (opk, osk) ← OKGen(pp). We
denote (opkj , oskj) as the j-th auditor. Moreover, each token
submitter generates an address for sending transactions.
We show the flow of our scheme in Fig. 1. The case in
which a token admitter issues a token is as follows:
Token Admitter i:
1) Randomly chooses rlink and runs (C, dec) ←
Commit(crs, rlink).
2) Defines ring R where pki ∈ R.
3) Designates an auditor j and let opkj be the public key.
4) According to the message format, prepares a message
M to be signed. M contains C and opkj .
5) Runs σ ← Sign(opkj ,M,R, ski) and sends (M,σ) to
a token submitter.
The case in which a token admitter revokes a token is as
follows. Assume that the token admitter has issued a token
σ′ on M on behalf of R, that M contains a commitment C,
and the token admitter knows the corresponding (rlink, dec).
In other word, no token admittor can revoke a token unless
the token was issued by myself.
Token Admitter i:
1) According to the message format, prepares a message
M to be signed. M contains (rlink, dec) and the hash
value of the transaction that σ′ is embedded.
2) Runs σ ← Sign(opkj ,M,R, ski) and sends (M,σ) to
a token submitter.
Token Admitters
Generate a ring signature     on a message:
- An address of the target user.
- A flag indicating either trustworthiness or untrustworthiness.  
- A public key of the designated auditor.
- A commitment (or the corresponding decommitment).
- e.t.c.
Token Submitters
Blockchain
A token is embedded 
on a transaction.
Auditors
……
𝜎
𝜎
𝜎
𝜎
𝜎
Address Designate an auditor 
𝜎
Users
The designated auditor 
can identify the corres-
ponding token admitter.
Fig. 1. Flow of our scheme
Next, the procedure for a token submitter is as follows:
Token Submitter:
1) If R contains unknown public key, then abort.
2) If opkj is not a public key of auditors, then abort.
3) If the expiry time contained in M has passed, then
abort.
4) If Verify(opkj ,M,R, σ) = 0, then abort.
5) Otherwise, embed (M,σ) to the corresponding trans-
action and send the transaction.
Next, the procedure for a token verifier is as follows:
Token Verifier:
1) If the expiry time contained in M has passed, then
abort.
2) Check the flag (for a trustworthiness token or an un-
trustworthiness token).
3) If M contains C and Verify(opkj ,M,R, σ) = 1, then
consider the token embedded to the transaction to be
valid.
4) If M contains (rlink, dec), then find the correspond-
ing transaction that contains the corresponding C (via
the hash value). If Verify(opkj ,M,R, σ) = 1 and
ComOpen(crs, C, rlink, dec) = 1, then consider the
token embedded to the transaction to be revoked.
Security Analysis: Due to the anonymity of accountable
ring signatures, token admitters can issue tokens to addresses
anonymously, and anyone can verify it. Only the designated
opener can identify the token admitter from the signature. The
designated opener can produce a proof of tracing, and due to
the tracing soundness, a signature cannot trace to two different
signers. In order to maintain anonymity of token admitters,
we assume that an adversary who would like to identify the
token admitter does not colude with the designated auditor
and the token submitter. We emphasize that auditors and
token submitters are not fully trusted, and are modeled as
semi-trusted entities that follow the protocol descriptions.
Due to the unforgeability, the address spesified by a token
admitter cannot be modified even by the corresponding token
submitter because a target address is contained to a signed
message. Moreover, token admitters have no way to produce
untraceable signatures due to the traceability.
If two tokens are generated by the same token ad-
mitter, then they are linked via C and (rlink, dec). Be-
cause of the binding property, other token admitters cannot
prepare (r′link, dec
′) where (r′link, dec
′) 6= (rlink, dec) that
ComOpen(crs, C, r′link, dec
′) = 1 holds. Because of the hiding
property, adding C as part of the message does not affect
anonymity. We remark that token admitters can generate
nonlinked tokens by randomly choosing C. However, the
designated auditor can identify token admitters even if they
generate such nonlinked tokens. For example, a token verifier
can ask the designated auditor who the actual token admitter
is when the corresponding transaction is not found in the step
4. That is, token admitters have no merit to generate such
TABLE I
RUNNING TIME OF THE BOOTLE ET AL. ACCOUNTABLE RING
SIGNATURE SCHEME
Algorithm Time (ms)
Sign 13.7
Verify 11.0
TABLE II
RUNNING TIME OF THE PEDERSEN COMMITMENT SCHEME
Algorithm Time (ms)
Commit/ComOpen 0.0072
tokens, and thus we assume that a token verifier can always
find the corresponding transaction if tokens are revoked.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we show our implementation results, in
which the Bootle et al. accountable ring signature scheme [11]
and the Pedersen commitment scheme [32]. We also em-
ployed Curve25519 [10] and checked that our scheme is ap-
plicable to Bitcoin, Ethereum, and NEM. We used MacBook
Pro (2.3 GHz Intel Core i5, 16 GB 2133 MHz LPDDR3)
and specified the ring size N = 16.7 According to this
setting, we set n = 4 and m = 2 as defined in [11],
where N = nm. Then, the signature size is as follows:
(log2N + 12)|G| + 13 (3 log2N + 12)|Zp| ≈ 1.4kB. In this
setting, the running times of the Sign and Verify algorithms
are given in Table I. We also show the running times of the
Commit/ComOpen algorithms in Table II. From these im-
plementation results, we can say that both cryptographic tools
are reasonable in blockchain systems in terms of efficiency.
Next, we confirmed that our scheme is applicable in terms
of both computational costs and remittance charge for Bitcoin,
Ethereum, and NEM. We estimated them using the exchange
rate on April 6, 2020. We implemented two cases:
1) We embedded a ring signature on the transaction di-
rectly. Then, one can check trustworthiness or untrust-
worthiness of a token unless the blockshain system is
down. Owing to high availability of blockshain systems,
it can be a merit of this case. On the other hand, we
needed to embed 1612 bytes in Bitcoin, 1619 bytes
in Ethereum, 1616 bytes in NEM, respectively, for
a transaction. Because the embeddable data size is
limited, it is a demerit of this case.
2) We embedded a hash value of a ring signature (and
its messages) and a URL of an outside storage (e.g.,
Google Drive,, DropBox, and so on) or path of “hash-
of-object” of a decentralized storage (e.g., InterPlan-
etary File System (IPFS)8), that preserves the ring
signature. If SHA256 is employed as the hash function,
then we can drastically reduce the data size (32 bytes)
and it can solve the demerit of the first case. However,
7We consider [36], which fixes the ring size to 11 in general.
8See https://ipfs.io/.
we needed to addditionally require to comfrim whether
its hash value is the same as that of the embedded one
after verifying the ring signature. Moreover, we need
to assume that the outside storage is also available, and
does not collude with other entities. Here, we simply
assumed that the outside storage is semi-honest, i.e., it
follows the protocol description.
Bitcoin: In Bitcoin, Bitcoin script is used to describe
transactions. To embed data to a transaction, we can use
OP RETURN. Because it embeds 80 bytes of data at once,
we needed to use 21 transactions for case 1 and 2 transactions
for case 2 when Google Drive URL (66 bytes) or IPFS
path (48 Bytes) is used. This result shows that we needed
to consider some meta-information that connect two (or
potentially more) transactions. One easy way to do this in
case 2 is to employ the transaction identity (txid) which is a
32 byte value. We embed the URL to transaction 1, and embed
the hash value of ring signatues and the txid of transaction 1
to transaction 2. If one would like to connect two transactions,
it finds transaction 1 via the txid in transaction 2, downloads
a ring signature and the corresponding message from either
the Google Drive URL or the path of IPFS in transaction
1, checks whether the signature is valid, and also checks
whether its hash value is the same as the hash value contained
in transaction 2. Basically, this simple way works in case
1. Regarding remittance charges, it is changed according to
the data size or the conditions of blockchains, and so on.
Moreover, the transaction may not be comfirmed depending
on remittance charges. As a reference, we needed to 0.002
BTC (e13.74) if the transaction is comfirmed within 5 min.
Although our scheme is applicable to Bitcoin in terms of
functionality point of view, there is a room for argument on
such high remittance charges.
Ethereum: In Ethereum, we embedded a token to data space
using the Ethereum wallet called MetaMask. Because we can
use high availability of blockchain systems, and 1 transaction
is enough for both cases, case 1 is better than case 2 for
Ethereum. We needed to pay 70,332 gas for case 1. When we
set a gas price of 2 gwei, it was 0.000093776 ETH (e0.015).
This result showed that the remittance fee was reasonable;
thus, we concluded that our scheme is applicable to Ethereum.
NEM: In NEM, the transaction/prepare-announce API is used
for sending a transaction. To embed data to a transaction,
we can use the message space. Because it embeds 1024
bytes of data at once, we needed to use 2 transactions for
case 1 and 1 transaction for case 2. We can employ txid to
connect two transactions as in the case 2 of bitcoin. In NEM
version 1, the remittance charge is estimated by fee(XEM)
= (MessageLength/32 + 1) ∗ 0.05(XEM). We needed 2.80
XEM (e0.10) in case 1, and in case 2 we needed 0.25
XEM (e0.009) when Google Drive URL (66 bytes) is used
and 0.20 XEM (e0.007) when IPFS path (48 bytes) is
used, respectively. Because we do not have to connect two
transactions, case 2 seems better than case 1 for NEM. This
results showed that the remittance fee was reasonable; thus,
we concluded that our scheme is applicable to NEM.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed an anonymous trust-marking
scheme on blockchain systems based on accountable ring
signatures and commitment, and confirmed that our scheme
is applicable to Bitcoin, Ethereum and NEM considering both
computational costs and remittance charges.
Since our system adds/revokes (un)trustworthiness to users
(addresses), we further need to consider how to evaluate
(un)trustworthiness of users (addresses) outside of our system.
As a simple way, the (un)trustworthiness of users (addresses)
can be assumed to be judged by external organizations such as
an investigative organization, and is shared to token admitters.
We leave considering such an evaluation system run outside
of our anonymous trust-marking scheme as a future work
of this paper. We simply assumed that if untrustworthiness is
added to an address, then nobody makes a deal to the address.
However, as a next step, it needs to more concretely consider
how can token verifiers utilize such tokens during or after a
cyber incident, and similary need to more concretely consider
how to utilize trustworthiness token. Considering a malicious
outside storage are also left as future works.
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